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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ELAINE HANSON NOBLE,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 20401

V. GLEN NOBLE,
Defendant/Respondent.
RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

ARGUMENT
STRONG POLICY REASONS FOR RETENTION OF
INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY FOR UNINTENTIONAL
TORTS OUTWEIGH COUNTERVAILING POLICY FOR ITS
ELIMINATION, AND IT SHOULD THEREFORE REMAIN
INTACT.
POINT I.
STOKER V. STOKER DOES NOT ABROGATE INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY FOR UNINTENTIONAL TORTS.
Appellant contends that the doctrine of interspousal
immunity for unintentional torts was eliminated in the case of
Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980).

That argument is

based on the fact that the Court did not distinguish in that
case between intentional and unintentional torts for purposes
of interspousal immunity.

Appellant's Brief, at 26.

The case of Stoker v. Stoker involved a wife's suit for
damages against her former husband for injuries he had intentionally inflicted prior to their divorce.

616 P.2d at 90.

Therefore, the issue before the Court was whether interspousal
immunity existed for intentional torts.

The Court did not have

before it either the facts or the issue of interspousal
immunity in an unintentional tort scenario.

Therefore, in

stating that interspousal immunity no longer existed, the Court
was making such declaration based on the facts and issue before
it.
Additionally, the Court supported its decision by rationale
set forth in Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696
(1954), which also addressed the issue of interspousal immunity
for intentional torts.

In Taylor, this Court stated that minor

instances of intentional contact should not be actionable but
that neither husband nor wife "consents to intentionally
inflicted serious personal injuries by the other." 275 P.2d at
699.

The Court reaffirmed its decision in Taylor v. Patten

which did not address interspousal immunity for unintentional
torts.

The Court's reliance on that case and reaffirmance of

it, especially in light of the facts in Stoker, strongly suggest the narrowness of the Court's focus.
Moreover, this Court in Stoker v. Stoker addressed its
rationale set forth in Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344,
384 P.2d 389 (1963), wherein the Court had discussed whether
the Married Women's Act proscribed a wife from suing her
husband in tort.

In reaffirming Taylor v. Patten, this Court
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in Stoker simply held that the Married Women's Act allowed a
wife to sue her husband for intentional torts committed prior
to their divorce.

616 P.2d at 591; Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d

1288, 1290 (Utah 1983).

This Court in Stoker did not address,

let alone overrule, the strong policy reasons set forth in
Rubalcava for maintaining interspousal immunity for unintentional torts.
Finally, subsequent decisions of this Court have shown that
Stoker was intended to eliminate interspousal immunity only for
intentional torts.

See Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1230

(Utah 1983) (citing Stoker v. Stoker:

"Confirming wife's right

to an action against her husband for the intentional infliction
of personal injuries"); Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Utah
1983) (citing Stoker v. Stoker:

"That case held that the

legislature had abolished that common law doctrine [interspousal immunity] insofar as it barred a wife's action for
personal injuries intentionally inflicted upon her by her
husband prior to their divorce"); Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d
864, 865 n.5 (Utah 1981) ("[In Stoker,] [t]his court declined
to apply the doctrine [of interspousal immunity] in an intentional tort case").
The foregoing discussion shows that Stoker recognized that
the Legislature had abolished interspousal immunity only
"insofar as it barred a wife's action for personal injuries
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intentionally inflicted upon her by her husband prior to their
divorce."

Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d at 1290.
POINT II.
STRONG POLICY REASONS EXIST FOR THE RETENTION OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY FOR UNINTENTIONAL TORTS.

Appellant asks this Court not to distinguish between intentional and unintentional torts for purposes of interspousal
immunity.

Such a contention clearly ignores the strong policy

and familial reasons for drawing such a distinction and applying different and appropriate standards accordingly.
The following discussion sets forth five policy reasons
that distinguish between intentional and unintentional torts
and support retention of interspousal immunity for unintentional torts.

Those policy reasons are as follows:

1.

Promotion of marital harmony;

2.

Prevention of collusive lawsuit;

3.

Avoidance of rewarding defendant spouse for his

or her own wrongdoing;
4.

Avoidance of the possibility of trivial or

spurious lawsuits between spouses; and
5.

A change in public policy of the State should

come from the Legislature.
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1.

Promotion of Marital Harmony

A commonly advanced and practical justification for maintaining interspousal immunity for unintentional torts is that
such suits would create or aggravate marital discord.

This

Court has recognized that "it should be the purpose of the law
to protect family solidarity."

Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah

2d 344, 384 P.2d 389, 391 (1963).

In Rubalcava, this Court

recognized that barring negligence suits between spouses
promotes, or at least preserves, harmony and tranquility in the
home and allows spouses to resolve these problems in a manner
that may enhance the marital relationship.
This Court has recognized and discarded as unpersuasive
arguments to the contrary.

The first such argument is that

"the wrongful act has likely impaired the marital harmony
anyway, so the lawsuit would not extend the rift, but, if anything, would tend to rectify it."
This Court was not persuaded.

Rubalcava, 384 P.2d at 389.

Clearly, such an argument has

merit in the context of the commission of an intentional tort.
That argument, however, has no merit in and should not be
extended to the commission of an unintentional tort.

There is

no reason to assume that an act of negligence reflects a lack
of marital harmony.
A second contrary argument is "that since the insurance
company, and not the defendant, will have to pay, the family

-5-

exchequer will not suffer so much by allowing the action as by
denying it, so the family harmony will not be harmed but may be
saved by allowing the action."

Id.,

at 390-91.

Once again,

this Court in Rubalcava rejected as unpersuasive the argument
that domestic harmony would not be impaired or that public
policy would be advanced by the institution of a lawsuit by the
injured spouse in cases in which the defendant spouse is
protected by liability insurance.

Admittedly, where insurance

coverage exists, the bringing of a lawsuit may not always
create or substantially enhance marital discord, but there
exists the likelihood of interspousal collusion, discussed
infra.

To the extent that marital disharmony would be reduced

by the availability of insurance, the potential for fraud is
increased.

Where no threat of fraud exists because there is no

insurance, the risk of marital discord is increased.

As one

court stated:
Adversary tort lawsuits between spouses have an
upsetting and embittering effect upon domestic tranquility and the marital relationship. But non-adversary lawsuits that do not disturb the peace and
harmony of the marriage encourage fraudulent and
collusive claims, particularly where a third-party
insurance company must pay any judgment awarded.
Snowten v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 4 7 5 So.2d
1211, 1212 (Fla. 1985) (quoting Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d
352, 355 (Fla. 1979), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980)).
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A third argument against the idea that such lawsuits would
inhibit marital harmony is that when one spouse brings a suit
against the other, there is little marital tranquility to
preserve.

That argument is unpersuasive.

Conjugal tranquility

may have been disturbed by the instigation of the lawsuit.
Clearly, the allegations, discovery, evidence, testimony and
posturing required to maintain or defend successfully a negligence action would create or aggravate tension and ruin an
otherwise salvageable marriage.

Where insurance exists, as

discussed above, and the strong policy of marital tranquility
is realized, it is unreasonable to assume that the defendant
spouse, who continued living with the plaintiff spouse, would
defend and assist in the defense wholeheartedly.
2.

Prevention of Collusive Lawsuits

A strong potential for collusive lawsuits between spouses
exists where an insurance company must defend the action and be
the real party in interest.

Three dangers exist.

The first

danger is that fraudulent or trumped-up claims will be made.
The second danger is that even where the claims are not
trumped-up, where the marriage is harmonious, the offending
spouse will not defend the action zealously.

The third danger,

as discussed above, is that where the offending spouse does
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defend zealously or wholeheartedly, as he or she should, tension and discord will arise.
any argument to the contrary.

This Court in Rubalcava discarded
384 P.2d at 390-91.

The contention that courts are capable of weeding out
fraudulent claims has been addressed and rejected by many
courts.

As one court stated:

We expect too much of human nature if we believe that
a husband and wife who sleep in the same bed, eat at
the same table, and spend money from the same purse
can be truly adversary to each other Ln a lawsuit when
any judgment obtained by the plaintiff spouse will be
paid by an insurance company and will ultimately
benefit both spouses. . . .
Furthermore, [these cases are] akin to the
dangerously prevalent view that such payments are free
if the insurance company pays for it. Of course,
someone, and us all, must pay insurance premiums which
are determined on the basis of risks and losses
incurred.
Snowten v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 4 75 So.2d
1211, 1213 (Fla. 1985) (quoting Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d
352, 355 (Fla. 1979), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980)).

See

also Green v. Green, 4 Ohio App. 3d 133, 446 N.E.2d 837, 838
(1982) ("The

immunity prevents fraud and collusion at the

expense of tactically disadvantaged insurance companies");
Lyons v.

Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E. 2d 533 (1965),

aff'd in Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 269, 383 N.E. 2d 888
(1978) ("It

is argued that the task of weeding out fraudulent

or collusive suits is properly within the sphere of Courts and

-8-

juries.

In truly adversary cases, fraud is likely to be

uncovered because of the desire of the defendant to avoid the
loss.

Where insurance is involved, the risk of loss is

removed, and both spouses stand to gain from a decision adverse
to the defendant.

This creates a strong inducement to trump up

claims and conceal possible defenses"); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or.
286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955) ("We

revere the jury system as the

bulwark of individual liberty, but we are also realists, and we
know that juries are, as a Kentucky mountaineer once
said - 'tolerable generous with other people's money,
especially when the aroma of insurance permeates the courtroom' ") .
Although insurance companies may be able to protect themselves against fraudulent claims by excluding spousal coverage
in the policy itself (contractual interspousal immunity) or by
increasing insurance rates to offset the cost of fraudulent
claims (overall subsidization of the cost of collusive interspousal claims), public policy and familial relationships are
not enhanced by these alternatives.
3.

Avoidance of Rewarding Defendant Spouse for His or Her
Own Wrongdoing

Public policy encourages and should encourage spouses to
cohabit and work out their differences.

Where one spouse

obtains a Court judgment against the other spouse but they

-9-

continue to cohabit, it is reasonable to assume that the
tort-feasor would share in the benefits of an award paid by the
defendant spouse's insurance company.
Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d 717, 719 (1974).

Burns v. Burns, 111
Snowten v. United States

Fidelity 8c Guaranty Co., 475 So.2d 1211, 1213 (Fla. 1985)
(citing Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1979), cert
denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980)).

Public policy should disfavor a

wrongdoer benefitting from his tortious conduct.
4.

Avoidance of the Possibility of Trivial or Spurious
Lawsuits Between Spouses

Marriage relationships are unusual in the sense that
partners are intimate emotionally, psychologically and
physically.

The marriage relationship should be conducive to

openness, compromise, adjustment and tolerance.
marriage let down their guards, as it should be.

People in
Because of

the individual differences and idiosyncrasies spouses bring to
their marriage, potential for conflict, tension and carelessness exists.

Despite the potential for collusive lawsuits,

abolition of interspousal immunity for unintentional torts
could lead to petty, trivial or spurious lawsuits between
spouses.

One can envision countless scenarios where conduct

between non-spouses would be considered tortious but should not
be considered tortious as between spouses.

Some examples might

include shoveling the walks, waxing the floor, taking out the
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garbage, caring for children, unsatisfactory completion of
other household duties and chores that cause injury, contraceptive use or sexual proclivity.

See Moore, The Case for

Retention of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 7 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 943
passum (1980) (giving examples of petty lawsuits that have been
filed and examples of foreseeable lawsuits).

Regardless of

whether abrogating spousal immunity for unintentional torts
would result in a rash of these lawsuits, a significant
question before the Court is whether the door even should be
opened to allow the potential for these suits or whether public
policy should continue to encourage spouses to resolve these
problems in ways more susceptible of mending familial relationships.

The abrogation of interspousal immunity for uninten-

tional torts could result in unwarranted intrafamilial
litigation.
5.

A Change in Public Policy of the State Should Come
From the Legislature

The abolition of interspousal immunity for unintentional
torts would constitute a radical departure from public policy
and traditional practice.
debatable at best.

The desirability of such a change is

Any such modification of public policy and

the law should be left to legislative discretion.
stated:

-11-

As one Court

As to tort law, elimination of the doctrine could
. . . open up a possibility of tort actions . . . that
could go to the heart of public policy and legislative
policy relating to marriage. . . . [T]he problem is
more appropriate for legislative solution than for
judicial determination. The General Assembly has
access to relevant information bearing upon these
matters more significant than afforded this
Court. . . .
Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161, 162-63 (Del. 1979), appeal
dismissed, 446 U.S. 931 (1980).

See also Rubalcava v.

Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389, 393 (1963) ("We are of
the opinion that under the circumstances, in fairness to those
who have relied thereon, and in proper deference to the
solidarity of the law, any change could be justified only to
correct patent error, otherwise it should be made by the legislature, plainly so declaring, so that all may be advised what
the change is and when it will be effective") (emphasis added);
Robeson v. International Indemnity Co., 282 S.E.2d 896 (Ga.
1981) ("it

is a rather close question as to whether abrogation

of the doctrine at this juncture would be a proper exercise of
judicial authority.

Although it is true that the doctrine is

of common-law origin, it is of long-standing application; and
it is not unrealistic to presume that people have come to rely
on it.

In addition, it is the General Assembly and not this

court that possesses the resources for determining the
viability of the various policy considerations.

On matters

such as whether husbands and wives should be allowed to sue
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each other in tort, the expressions of public policy should
come from the legislative branch") (citing Rubalcava v.
Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963)); Green v. Green,
4 Ohio App. 3d 133, 446 N.E. 2d 837, 838 (Ohio App. 1982)("If
there is to be change in the public policy of the state
[regarding interspousal immunity for unintentional torts], it
should emanate from the General Assembly") (citing Lyons v.
Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965));
As one Court noted, this Court's abolition of interspousal
immunity for intentional torts did not change public policy but
promoted it.

In Green v. Green the court stated:

[T]he public policy considerations used to support
interspousal immunity for negligent torts are not
applicable to, nor are they advanced by, the imposition of interspousal immunity in the area of intentional torts. We believe the ability of one spouse to
sue the other for an intentional tort promotes the
general public policy of providing a remedy for wrongs
done and deterring intentional conduct such as assault
and battery.
446 N.E. 2d at 839.

That court noted, however, that abolition

of interspousal immunity for unintentional torts would be a
radical change in public policy and would best be left to the
legislature in such a debatable departure from traditional
practice.
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CONCLUSION
Interspousal immunity for unintentional torts should remain
intact for the reasons set forth above.

Elimination of

the

immunity would be a radical departure from the common law and
the strong public policy favoring the maintenance of familial
relationships.

Inroads into familial and marital solidarity

should be resisted. >
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